This book attempts an in-depth study of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict from an angle that differs from previous books. The author questions Nehru’s decision to accept China’s suzerainty over Tibet without bargaining for secured borders.
The author assesses the origin of the conflict, the role of Tibet, India’s Forward Policy and its intelligence failure, and the border scenario, both under British rule and after independence. Legal terms that are often used and misused to describe border conflicts are explored, as is the organisational structure of the Indian Army. The author asks why the Indian Air Force was not used in an offensive role and why military dictatorship is not viable in India.
The book also considers how Mao unintentionally united the whole of India for the first time in Indian history, and saved democracy by eliminating the possibility of dictatorship. Finally, it looks at Nehru’s gifting of the Gilgit region to Pakistan, which was not a factor in the war, but is now significant for India in view of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC.
Ultimately, the book is intended to provide concise information on the war for the younger generation of India, so that they may look back on and reappraise the war and be encouraged to engage in further discussions: Those who don’t know about history are doomed to repeat it!